In an unprecedented breach of trust at Foggy Bottom, the U.S. State Department has been rocked by a sophisticated embezzlement scheme that siphoned more than $650,000 from its diplomatic coffers. Levita Almuete Ferrer—also known professionally as Levita Brezovic—a 64-year-old senior budget analyst in the Office of the Chief of Protocol, has admitted guilt to federal charges of theft of government property. Her guilty plea, entered this week in federal court in Washington, D.C., exposes serious lapses in financial oversight within one of America’s most prominent foreign-policy institutions. Over a two-year span, Ferrer exploited her check-signing authority and digital accounting knowledge to funnel exactly $657,347.50 into personal accounts—all while meticulously falsifying records to evade detection.
1. A Two-Year Fraud, Uncovered
1.1 Scope and Scale
Between March 2022 and April 2024, Ferrer systematically wrote 60 checks from an official State Department account into her own bank accounts, on top of three additional checks made out to a confidant. Each transaction, carried out in amounts carefully calibrated to avoid immediate red flags, culminated in more than $650,000 diverted away from the government’s diplomatic mission budget. To appreciate the magnitude, consider that this sum could have underwritten the annual salary for multiple entry-level Foreign Service officers or funded a small U.S. consulate’s operational costs for an entire year.
1.2 Methodical Execution
Prosecutors detail how Ferrer personally printed, signed, and deposited each check—bypassing any co-signatures or secondary approvals typically required for large disbursements. She then used her working knowledge of the department’s QuickBooks ledgers to conceal her tracks: after physically issuing a check in her name, she returned to the digital system and replaced her name with that of an approved vendor, effectively disguising the outflows as legitimate payments for protocol services.
2. The Mechanics of Deception
2.1 Exploiting Signature Authority
As a senior budget analyst, Ferrer held signature authority over a dedicated diplomatic funds account. While her role necessitated autonomy to process time-sensitive protocol expenses, the absence of periodic co-signing or electronic alerts created a single-point-of-failure: one individual with unchecked control could authorize—and conceal—unauthorized payments without immediate scrutiny.
2.2 QuickBooks Cover-Up
Digital records often provide the audit trail that catches embezzlers. Yet Ferrer’s scheme capitalized on a critical gap: QuickBooks allowed post-issuance edits to payee fields. By deliberately printing checks under her own name and then retroactively editing them to appear as payments to a bona fide vendor, she duped routine auditors reviewing the software’s reports. Unless auditors cross-referenced printed check images against bank statements, the fraud remained hidden in plain sight.
2.3 Exploiting Human Oversight
Cybersecurity consultant Rafael Moreno explains, “This isn’t rocket science—it’s understanding the disconnect between virtual records and physical transactions. Ferrer guaranteed the digital ledgers looked squeaky clean, knowing that most finance officers wouldn’t compare ledger entries line-by-line against voided check stubs, especially in a high-volume diplomatic office.”
3. The Office of the Chief of Protocol: A Prestigious, Vulnerable Target
3.1 Strategic Importance
The Office of the Chief of Protocol orchestrates every aspect of foreign-leader visits to the United States. From arranging state dinners and accreditation of diplomats to managing Blair House—the President’s guesthouse—this office administers millions of dollars in taxpayer funds every year. Its work is front and center in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy.
3.2 Trust and Responsibility
Ferrer’s role placed her at the epicenter of this high-profile division. As a senior budget analyst, her responsibilities included forecasting costs, reviewing invoices, and ensuring that protocol expenditures adhered to appropriations and host-country agreements. Her actions thus pierced the core of the department’s public image: a trusted, respected institution charged with representing American values abroad.
4. Profile of the Perpetrator: Who Is Levita Ferrer?
4.1 Career Trajectory
Though details of Ferrer’s early career remain sealed, court filings confirm that she had decades of experience ascending through federal financial management ranks. Senior budget analysts typically possess advanced degrees in accounting or public administration, alongside years of progressively responsible roles—first as junior accountants, then as supervisory budget officers. Ferrer’s position signified both technical expertise and unwavering trust from her superiors.
4.2 Possible Motives
Investigators continue to probe Ferrer’s personal finances and lifestyle to explain her decision to betray that trust. Common motivations in white-collar crime include overwhelming personal debt, lifestyle inflation, or a gradual erosion of ethical boundaries under the assumption that small acts would go unnoticed. As part of her plea agreement, Ferrer must cooperate with prosecutors, potentially offering insights into her motivations and revealing whether other individuals or systemic oversights contributed to her actions.
5. Guilty Plea and Legal Ramifications
5.1 Federal Charges and Sentence Exposure
Ferrer pleaded guilty to one count of theft of government property—a charge carrying a maximum sentence of 10 years in federal prison. Sentencing, scheduled for September 18, will consider the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which typically weigh the fraud amount, the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, and prior criminal history. First-time offenders often receive sentences well below the statutory maximum, but the unprecedented scale of this scheme, combined with her senior role, could influence a harsher penalty.
5.2 Restitution and Forfeiture
Under her plea agreement, Ferrer has agreed to repay the full $657,347.50 in embezzled funds. A parallel forfeiture money judgment secures the government’s right to recover assets, which may include garnishing bank accounts, seizing personal property, or placing liens on real estate—ensuring that the taxpayers do not bear the financial loss.
5.3 Cooperation and Broader Investigation
White-collar prosecutors often leverage plea deals to uncover systemic vulnerabilities and identify additional malefactors. Ferrer’s cooperation could uncover whether she acted alone or in concert with vendors, outside consultants, or fellow insiders who might have benefited from or facilitated the scheme.
6. Systemic Oversight Failures
6.1 Segregation of Duties Breakdown
A fundamental principle of financial control is segregation of duties: no single employee should have end-to-end authority over a transaction. By concentrating check issuance, deposit reconciliation, and record-keeping under one person, the State Department left itself exposed. Budget offices must ensure that transaction initiation, authorization, and recording are handled by separate staff members—yet in this case, those safeguards were effectively bypassed.
6.2 Audit and Review Gaps
Routine audits—both internal and by the Government Accountability Office—did not flag the discrepancies. This suggests that audit procedures in the Protocol Office either did not include unannounced spot checks of physical check stubs, or auditors lacked the technical tools and staffing to cross-verify digital records with bank statements. Moreover, high turnover and staffing shortages during the administration transition may have weakened oversight.
6.3 Administration Transition Vulnerabilities
Ferrer carried out most of her scheme during a period of administrative turnover between the Biden and Trump administrations. Such transitions often introduce gaps in leadership, policy shifts, and reassignment of career staff—creating windows of opportunity for malfeasance. Institutional memory may lapse when experienced personnel depart or when new officials are focused on strategic directives rather than granular control reviews.
7. A Parallel Incident: Diplomatic Security in Brussels
7.1 The Hotel Amigo Confrontation
Just weeks before Ferrer’s guilty plea, diplomatic circles were abuzz over a separate misconduct case: a member of Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s security detail was arrested in Brussels on March 31, 2025. Sources report that the agent became aggressive after hotel staff refused to reopen the bar, leading to a scuffle with Belgian police. The embassy intervened to secure the agent’s release, though Rubio—attending a NATO summit—was not present.
7.2 Implications for Security Oversight
This incident underscores similar systemic challenges: overworked supervisors on DSS details, long hours, and split responsibilities. Allegedly, shift leaders juggle administrative tasks, personnel evaluations, and real-time security operations—creating stress and lapses in judgment. Both the embezzlement and security altercation point to the need for robust workload management and clear protocols.
8. Diplomatic Consequences: Eroding International Credibility
8.1 Anti-Corruption Advocacy Undermined
The United States frequently champions anti-corruption measures abroad, from congressional hearings to State Department-led programs in emerging democracies. A high-profile corruption scandal within the diplomatic corps provides fodder for foreign critics, who can point to domestic hypocrisy when American envoys decry similar practices overseas.
8.2 Budgetary and Operational Risks
Financial irregularities can trigger congressional scrutiny of State Department appropriations. If legislators perceive that funds are vulnerable to theft, they may impose tighter restrictions, reduce budgets, or demand more frequent and granular reporting—potentially impeding embassy operations, cultural exchanges, and foreign assistance programs.
9. Leadership Under Scrutiny: Secretary Rubio’s Challenges
9.1 Concentration of Roles
In President Trump’s second term, Senator Marco Rubio has assumed multiple portfolios—Secretary of State, acting national security adviser, interim USAID administrator, and acting archivist of the National Archives. While demonstrating presidential trust, these combined duties risk overextension and dilute his capacity to oversee each agency effectively.
9.2 A Call for Delegation and Reform
To restore confidence and tighten financial controls, Rubio may need to delegate day-to-day oversight of diplomatic finances to a senior career official or undersecretary. Bolstering the Office of the Inspector General and directing immediate audits of high-risk divisions could also signal a commitment to accountability.
10. Charting a Path Forward: Recommended Reforms
Experts across government recommend a suite of measures to prevent future fraud:
-
Reinforce Segregation of Duties: Mandate dual-signature requirements for checks above a modest threshold and assign separate teams to authorize, record, and reconcile transactions.
-
Automated Anomaly Detection: Invest in analytics software that flags unusual payment patterns—such as repeated payments to a vendor outside established thresholds or edits to payee fields after check issuance.
-
Unannounced Audits: Conduct surprise reviews of physical and electronic records, rotating audit teams to avoid predictable patterns.
-
Enhanced Whistleblower Protections: Streamline anonymous reporting channels and guarantee protection against retaliation for employees who raise concerns.
-
Digital Modernization: Upgrade legacy QuickBooks deployments to enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems with immutable audit logs and restricted post-issuance editing.
Conclusion
The guilty plea of Levita Almuete Ferrer in the State Department’s $650,000 embezzlement scandal represents more than an isolated crime—it is a cautionary tale about the fragility of financial controls in high-stakes diplomatic environments. As Ferrer awaits sentencing and Congress ramps up oversight, the Department must reckon with systemic vulnerabilities that allowed a single employee to exploit both human trust and technological loopholes. Simultaneously, separate events—like the Brussels security-detail incident—highlight the broader challenges facing America’s diplomatic corps: overburdened personnel, leadership transitions, and the delicate balance between protocol and enforcement.
Restoring confidence in U.S. diplomacy will require concerted leadership from Secretary Rubio, rigorous implementation of reforms, and a transparent demonstration that the State Department holds itself to the same anti-corruption standards it advocates globally. Only then can Foggy Bottom reestablish the financial integrity and professional excellence upon which American soft power depends.
